喻园管理论坛2022年第16期(总第785期)

演讲主题: Sourcing Innovation and Production

主 讲 人: 樊潇帅，南方科技大学商学院信息系统及管理工程系助理教授

主 持 人: 石冠群，威尼斯欢乐娱人城·首页财务金融系讲师

活动时间: 2022年6月16日（周四）10:30-12:00

活动地点：腾讯会议ID：599-154-572

主讲人简介：

樊潇帅，南方科技大学商学院信息系统及管理工程系助理教授，威尼斯欢乐娱人城·首页管理学学士，香港科技大学运筹学博士。研究领域为机制设计及拍卖理论、行为运营管理、可持续运营管理、创新管理等，获得中国运筹学会行为运筹与管理分会青年教师优秀论文奖(2020)。主持国家自然科学基金青年科学基金项目、深圳市面上基金项目。已在Management Science, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management，Production and Operations Management 等管理学顶级期刊发表论文多篇。

活动简介：

We consider a buyer firm that sources the design and production of an innovative product from two suppliers. The value of a supplier’s design depends on the supplier’s effort, while the production cost is the supplier’s private information. A supplier can potentially produce the design of another supplier, albeit at a switching cost added to the production cost. Hence, a sourcing mechanism of an innovative product should both motivate suppliers’ innovation efforts to improve the design value and identify low-cost production solutions. We first investigate two sourcing mechanisms commonly observed in practice, under which the buyer commits to sourcing the design and the production jointly or separately. We then compare these two mechanisms with a no-commitment mechanism in which the buyer specifies the rules to select suppliers for design and production after receiving the designs submitted by suppliers. We also consider an enhanced-commitment mechanism in which the buyer commits to using the supplier who provides the best design for production. We compare the buyer’s profit in each mechanism, and show that the mechanism of choice depends on the switching cost and the cost (effectiveness) of innovation investment to improve design values, because each mechanism has different capability to motivate innovation efforts and to achieve efficient design and production allocations. Our findings provide valuable managerial insights for practitioners and help explain why certain mechanisms are common in different industries.