喻园管理论坛2019年第56期(总第507期)

演讲主题: Information Sharing, Pricing Timing and Platform Selection

主 讲 人: 汪玉兰，香港理工大学物流与航运系副教授

主 持 人: 关旭教授，生产运作与物流管理系

活动时间: 2019年5月9日（周四）上午9:30-11:30

活动地点: 威尼斯欢乐娱人城·首页130教室

主讲人简介：

汪玉兰副教授于杜克大学获得企业管理博士学位，本科和硕士均毕业于上海交通大学。汪玉兰教授的研究成果发表于Management Science, Operations Research, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, Production and Operations Management等国际顶级期刊，研究兴趣包括供应链管理，可持续性运营管理以及运营管理中的行为研究。汪玉兰教授目前担任Production and Operations Management的senior editor, Omega的associate editor, Production and Operations Management编辑评委会成员以及Transportation Research - Part E编辑顾问委员会成员。

活动简介：

In this study, we consider two platforms, an agency platform that allows suppliers to direct sell the product to customers, and a hybrid platform that acts as both an agency platform and an e-retailer buying products from suppliers and then reselling to customers. A supplier that originally sells its product to the hybrid platform now wants to sell its product direct to consumers on either of the two platforms. To attract the supplier to direct sell on their own platform, both the agency platform and the hybrid platform may share their downstream demand information with the supplier. We then explore the platforms' information sharing decisions and the supplier's platform selection decision by studying a four-stage game under two (wholesale) pricing timing scenarios. That is, the wholesale prices may be determined before (named early pricing) or after (named late pricing) the platforms' strategic information sharing decisions. We show that under both pricing timing scenarios, the agency platform shares demand information voluntarily with the supplier. However, such free information sharing always benefits the supplier under the early pricing but may hurt the supplier under the late pricing. We also show that the double marginalization induced by information sharing dampens the hybrid platform's incentive to share information. When the commission rate charged by the platform is low and demand uncertainty is not so high, the supplier always prefers direct selling on the agency platform under the late pricing but may prefer direct selling on the hybrid platform under the early pricing. When the pricing timing can be determined upfront, we find that the supplier always prefers late pricing while the hybrid platform prefers early pricing when the commission rate is large and the signal accuracy is high.