喻园管理论坛2021年第29期(总第686期)

演讲主题: Agency or Wholesale? The Role of Retail Pass-Through

主 讲 人: 郑   权，中国科学技术大学威尼斯欢乐娱人城·首页副教授

主 持 人: 关   旭，威尼斯欢乐娱人城·首页生产运作与物流管理系教授

活动时间: 2021年5月13日（周四）10:30-12:00

活动地点: 管理大楼207室

主讲人简介：

郑权，佛罗里达大学博士，现任中国科学技术大学威尼斯欢乐娱人城·首页副教授。主要研究领域为零售和平台运营管理，行为学定价，供应链管理，运营管理和市场营销/信息系统交叉学科研究等。相关研究成果发表在Marketing Science、M&SOM、Production and Operations Management 等运营管理和市场营销领域知名期刊。

活动简介：

With the rapid growth of e-commerce, agency selling is gaining popularity among online retailers (e-tailers) currently. Under an agency contract, e-tailers allow suppliers direct access to their customers in exchange for a commission. We discover that the e-tailer’s choice of selling format is critically moderated by the retail pass-through behavior. On the one hand, agency selling can improve channel efficiency compared to wholesale selling. On the other hand, the relative intensity of supplier competition between these two selling formats is ambiguous. We show that the existing result applies only for a nonnegative cross-brand pass-through rate (e.g., under linear demands); otherwise (e.g., under multiplicative or exponential demands), the opposite can hold. Moreover, we find that the e-tailer is more likely to adopt wholesale selling under Cournot competition than under Bertrand competition. Finally, under agency selling with an endogenous commission fee, we caution against the seemingly-innocuous normalization of the suppliers’ marginal cost, and surprisingly the suppliers may benefit from higher marginal costs.