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【学术通知】暨南大学威尼斯欢乐娱人城·首页教授姚加权:Trust and Contracts: Empirical Evidence

  • 发布日期:2020-12-02
  • 点击数:

  

喻园管理论坛2020年第27期(总第644期)

演讲主题: Trust and Contracts: Empirical Evidence

主 讲 人: 姚加权,暨南大学威尼斯欢乐娱人城·首页教授

主 持 人: 邓   洋,财务金融系讲师

活动时间: 2020年12月23日(周三)15:30-17:30

网络直播平台:腾讯会议,会议ID:140 290 984

主讲人简介:

姚加权,暨南大学金融学教授,博导。博士毕业于新加坡南洋理工大学,研究方向包括公司金融,信息经济学,金融科技,文本分析和机器学习,论文发表于Review of Financial Studies,Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,Journal of Banking and Finance和《管理科学学报》等国内外权威期刊,以及计算机顶会WWW2018和KDD2020。

活动简介:

Trust between parties should drive the negotiation and design of contract: if parties did not trust each others’ reaction to unplanned events, they might agree to pay higher costs of negotiation to complete contracts. Using a unique sample of U.S. principal-agent consulting contracts and a negative shock to trust between parties staggered across space and over time, we find that lower trust increases contract completeness. Not only contract complexity but also the verifiable states of the world contracts cover increase after a drop in trust. The results hold for several text-analysis-based measures of completeness and do not arise when agents are also principals (shareholders) or in other falsification tests. Non-compete agreements, confidentiality and indemnification clauses, and restrictions to agents’ actions are more likely to be added to contracts signed in the same locations, same industries, and same years after a negative shock to trust.

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